Analyses of comparative constitutional law are frequently framed by a particular vision of constitutionalism that we call the 'structural-liberal' vision. This vision sees the purpose of constitutional as being one of limiting state power -its 'liberal' component -which is done through the construction of a particular set of institutional architectures-such as judicial constitutional review, judicial protection and enforcement of fundamental rights, separation of powers, rule of law, etc. -its 'structural component. In this paper, we argue that such analyses are incomplete. The structural-liberal vision is but one of a number of ways of conceptualizing constitutionalism. It is the product of a particular time and place, and reflects the particular concerns and experiences of that time and place. Conversely, there are other kinds of important constitutional concerns and experiences that the structural liberal-vision renders invisible. These include processes of constitutional emergence and evolution, and symbiotic relationships between constitutionalism and other aspects of the regulatory environment (such as the economic structure of the state).
rather than on whether it would be effective at carrying out national policy or in resisting outside interference. 8 The newness of the post-independence state, and its democratic fragility (as evinced, most particularly, by Shays' Rebellion, the direct inspiration for the drafting of the new constitution 9 ), discouraged supporters of the new constitution from appealing to national solidarity or to constituent power as the principal device for protecting these liberties. In fact, as noted above, the constitution was intended in part to constrain constituent power, as Madison famously acknowledged in his 10 th Federalist. 10 Therefore its defenders, using the mechanical political-economic analyses invented by the Baron de Montesquieu to explain the success of the English constitution, focused on particularities of the new constitution's institutional design that, they argued, would prevent the dangerous aggrandizements of political power feared by the constitution's political opponents.
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And so emerged the particular foci of the structural-liberal vision -a focus on safety rather than efficiency (because the United States would never really be threatened by an outside force 12 ); and a focus on structure rather than on constituent power (because constituent power was the danger that the constitution was trying to overcome 13 ). Over the succeeding two centuries, elements would be added to and subtracted from the structural pantheon as the United States responded to new regulatory problemsTocqueville would introduce 'democracy' in the mid-19 th century, and progressivism would then convert democracy from a participatory to an electoral democracy towards the end of that century. 14 The modern, positivist understanding of the 'rule of law' 15 would also emerge in the late 19 th century as a regulatory response to national industrialization. 16 At the same time, industrialization would also cause the pre-eminent status that the 'right to property' had enjoyed in the 19 th century constitution to be considerably demoted. 17 In the aftermath of the Second World War, the increasing pluralization of American political society would lead to the substitution of equality for liberty as the constitutional telos. 18 To be sure, the American structural-liberal vision was not the only constitutionalism to emerge out of the revolutions of the late 18 th and early 19 th centuries. Different visions were to emerge out of Revolutionary France, 19 and Tory, 20 Whiggish, 21 and radical often interacted with each other and with the structural-liberal vision, changing and being changed as each continually experienced new kinds of concerns (see also below). But as we shall see, such hegemonic dominance is problematic when applied to constitutional situations that differ from those the structural-liberal vision evolved to address. And this counsels strongly that we need to be more aware of the limits of its vision, and how they can be overcome.
The remainder of this chapter will proceed in three parts. The second part will explore some of the principal blind-spots in the structural-liberal vision. These include its relative disinterest in issues of state-building; its inability to perceive dynamics of constitutional evolution; and its inability to account for the interdependences that tie the effectiveness of particular constitutional structures to particular environmental factors that Finally, Part IV will examine how these limitations might be transcended.
II. THE STRUCTURAL-LIBERAL VISION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS BLIND SPOTS

A. State Building
A constitution plays a significant role in the dynamic process of state building. 28 This is missed in a vision of constitutionalism that approaches it solely as a program of limiting public powers through legal norms. Such a model is incapable of exploring how the constitution gains meaningful purchase in an environment in which the driving concern is one of creating the apparatus of government and fomenting the idea of the state where it is weak or non-existent. A study of the constitution in any context is deficient if it is exhausted by a study of positive legal restraints on the use of governmental power; constitutional enquiry is as much about the exercise of public power.
(There is thus irony in the fact that the US Constitution of 1789 was itself a good example of this process of constitutional state-building, given its subsequent influence on the structural liberal vision of state-limitation. As noted by Hannah Arendt, the selfconception of the American founders speaks in an entirely clear, unambiguous language: their question, "was not how to limit power but how to establish it, not how to limit government but how to found a new one." 29 ) 28 See also Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 1990 to strategically control state power: to be able to intentionally disaggregate it, assign it, and limit it to some particular constellation of institutional sites. Constitutional evolution, by contrast, involves the release and reconfiguration of state power in ways that exceed the reins of strategic intentionality. 39 The spontaneous character of this evolution suggests that even in the most mature and robust of constitutional systems, public power is able to evade, or circumvent the formal constitutional architecture, extending itself in ways that bypass initial design constraints.
But at the same time, such spontaneous evolution need not be destructive for the project of constitution-building. On the contrary, challenge and disruption might be necessary in order to 'destabilize' dominant but unsustainable constitutional ideas and practices, to provoke an internal response to an external noise. 40 Indeed, the hallmark of a mature constitutional system might be in structurally recognizing when spontaneous circumvention is necessary in order to respond to new imperatives, and in nevertheless being able to ensure that this evolution preserves the constitution's foundational spirit.
Again, this is problematic for the structural-liberal vision, because that vision regards unchanneled public power as innately corrupting and dangerous.
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Whilst such concerns are often justified, liberalism nevertheless ultimately fails to account for the political reality of constitutional survival. The fact that in all successful constitutions, including liberal ones, power always demonstrates capacity to evade strategic control, and yet nevertheless often ends up contributing to rather than corrupting the 41 See, e.g., Holmes, Passions and Constraints.
constitutional project, suggests strongly that the liberal constitutionalists blanket fear of 'unbridled power' is too simplistic. Sometimes, a constitution needs power to free itself at least somewhat from its constitutional constraints -for the sake of that constitutionalism's own survival.
42
The structural-liberal vision of constitutionalism cannot satisfactorily account for the phenomena of evolutionary change and revolutionary rupture. In fact, it effectively presumes that our knowledge of the possibilities and impossibilities of constitutionalism and its future is already complete, 43 a presumption that David Sciulli has well-termed "the fallacy of exhausted possibilities" in American constitutional thought. 44 To identify, for example, constitutionalism with judicial supremacy leaves no conceptual purchase for critical reflection on the possibility that in particular environments there are other ways of achieving the ends it is supposed to achieve; and that in at least some of these particular environments, these alternative means may represent improvements over the structuralliberal understanding. 45 By linking liberalism to particular institutional structures, and then by identifying constitutionalism primarily by their presence, structural-liberalism not only fails to explain constitutional evolution, it also fails to leave conceptual room for constitutional innovation and idiosyncrasy. should or not. 55 Weimar Germany was not the only European country threatened by constitutional collapse in the 1930s. 56 England was vulnerable too. 57 The English constitutional system survived of course (the Great Depression was not as brutal there as it was in Germany). But at the same time, it was also able to do so without judicial review.
Structural liberalism has no explanation for how it was able to do so, when Germany could not.
When considerations of systemic symbiosis are brought fully into perspective, the liberal-structural model can seem distorting and even dysfunctional. By obscuring systemic interdependencies, the liberal vision shines a far too narrow light on the range of difficulties that can effect constitutional survival. 58 Similarly, it also threatens to misconstrue, by obscuring and mislabeling as ersatz, constitutional structures and dynamics that diverge from those in the structural liberal pantheon, but which nevertheless may be more promising and/or appropriate in light of that particular constitutional system's larger social environment (see especially Dowdle, this volume).
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Another example involves the relationship between the constitution and the socioeconomic-industrial structure of the polity, an issue that has recently been revitalized in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. 60 Structural-liberalism's inability to visualize the constitution's interdependence with its surrounding social environment can lend it to induce dysfunctional economic biases into its normative prescriptions. Structural-liberalism tends to conflate the material constitution (i.e., the way a constitution should distribute wealth and resources within its polity) with what we might call the constitution of liberty (i.e., the way a constitution should distribute 'liberty', and especially negative liberty, within its polity) (a conflation that sometimes referred to as 'Manchester liberalism'). 61 This causes structural-liberalism to privilege demands for procedural or formal equality over demands for material equality; and that, in turn, causes it generally to privilege demands for economic (neo-)liberalism over demands for social democracy (see also Wilkinson, this volume). 62 But as has been re-emphasized since the Global Financial Crisis, material equality is an equally important factor for constitutional success: issues of material equality cannot be compensated for simply by promoting greater procedural (formal) equality.
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III. INTERLOCKING VISIONS
As described in the introduction to this chapter, other visions of constitutionalism exist -each, like the structural-liberal vision, adapted to address a particular set of concerns and problems, which have their own non-parochial relevance. In France, the Jacobins - 74 -a process that ultimately culminated in the establishment of Jacksonian Democracy. 75 The American structural-liberal vision, and in particular its way of regulating democracy, were influential on Dicey. 76 status of the citizen, 91 have 'rediscovered' the older, classic Republicanism of the earlymodern era. 92 In UK public law scholarship, a 'political' -sometimes labeled 'republican' -constitutionalism has re-emerged, attempting to reclaim the broader concept of the constitution as meaning the strength and health of the body politic, a concept that has been erased from view in the modernizing processes of constitutional reform and liberal discourses of fundamental rights. 93 But it, too, did not emerge in isolation, but as a dialogical response to the 'legal constitutionalism' of the structural-liberal vision 94 , and in particular in the need to question that vision's presumption of the presence of an overarching rational consensus among the polity that supposedly allows for the judicialisation of political process and juridification of social relationships. 95 Thus, constitutionalism has always been both a cosmopolitan and a pluralist idea. As Neil Walker has noted, "the humanist gene in the idea of popular sovereignty" means that even "the most introverted, culturally monolithic and exclusionary national ideology will develop certain universalist themes." 96 At the same time, and despite the universalism of constitutional thought, constitutional discourse always has to acknowledge its rootedness in a particular polity, to acknowledge some spatial boundary and limit: "even the most avowedly universalist framework of self-government must draw from and reinvest in its own particular experience." 97 Whatever ideological commitments it makes towards a moral universalism based on the individual, the constitution is always constructed in a specific social setting with a specific political morality and contributes towards the building of a particular state or polity. But this polity is not a given, it is in turn shaped by the particular ideals that inform that state's constitutional development, those that resonate somewhat uniquely in their particular political community and forge (or fail to forge) social solidarity amongst its members. (See also Wilkinson, this volume.)
Seen in this light, modern constitutionalism is ultimately a balancing act, informed by an incredible diversity of constitutional experiences, but nevertheless uniquely attached to its political circumstances. 98 The problem with liberalism here is thus two fold. On the one hand, it obscures the diversity of sources from which a 'living' constitutional tradition can be constructed. On the other hand, its own inherent universalism leaves a polity no room or reason for feeling any special attachment to its own particular constitutional order. Given the (generally unacknowledged) evolutions in structural liberalism described above, this threatens to reduce constitutionalism simply to a political-cosmopolitan zeitgeist, as when the European Union constitutionalisation process is considered "an important stage along the route to a politically constituted world society," 99 despite its evident fragmentation and conflict. In order for constitutionalism to continue to develop its myriad possibilities, its diversity of experiences and visions must be recognized, and critically scrutinised. How we might do this is the subject of the next and final part to this chapter. 
IV. LOOKING BEYOND LIBERALISM
As noted in the introduction, the lesson in all this is that we need to expand our constitutional imagination in ways that allow us to look beyond liberalism -not rejecting liberalism per se, but realizing its limitations and developing conceptual tools that can help us transcend them.
Some argue that such cosmopolitan, cross-cultural explorations of 'law' -including constitutional law -is impossible. 100 The complexities of cultural diversity -the differences in languages, cultural metaphors, social meanings, social experiences -render any attempt at cross-cultural normative or conceptual synthesis ultimately futile. There are at least two responses to this kind of skepticism.
The first is methodological. Even if it is true that we can never really know if we accurately understand another culture (or even another individual), it doesn't matter: we can never really know if we can't understand another culture (or person) either. Both positions start from a presumption of either ultimate incomprehensibility or ultimate comprehensibly. There is no reason for preferring one to the other. For that reason, we have at least as much justification for pursuing the possibilities inherent in comprehensibly as we do for presuming that such pursuits will be in vain.
The second response to the skeptical assertion is empirical. It is not hard to find demonstration of complex cooperation across cultures, cooperation that simply could not work if cross-cultural understanding were impossible -e.g., cross-cultural marriages, cross- 101 What differs among cultures is the way perception and cognition are expressed -i.e., the symbols and metaphors that we use to locate particular perceptions and cognitions into our larger understanding of the world. 102 The key to our exploration therefore lies in looking beyond expressions and metaphors, and at the rationality and coherence that underlies the statement.
Along these lines, a good starting point for looking 'beyond liberalism' is the interpretive principle that Donald Davidson famously called "the principle of charity." 103 The principle of charity starts from the observation that the best heuristic for determining the meaning of a particular statement is to assume that the speaker is 'making sense' -i.e., to privilege interpretations that maximize the coherence and meaning of the statement.
This involves, for example, presuming that the speaker is rational, presuming that she is not intending to be normatively deceptive (although she might be wrong on particular factual matters), and that she is trying to be persuasive to her particular audience. 104 The comparative advantage of the principle of charity is not that it gives the most accurate understanding of the intentions of the speaker. It is not to help us understand why somebody said what she did; or if or how that statement benefits her interests. Its purpose is to maximize our ability to learn from the speaker's statement. Consistent with this approach, this volume demonstrates how listening to alternative constitutional experiences using a principle of charity allows us to better perceive and account for the limits of liberalism, and at the same time to defend the cosmopolitan vitality of the constitutional project.
At the same time, the principle of charity demands that this listening be reflexive rather than passive. Reflexivity, as Neil Walker notes, "amounts to more than providing a reflection. . . . Rather it is about the quality of ipseity -of the capacity for self-reflection and the possibility of self-transformation inherent in that capacity." 105 This reflexivity is more demanding than the orthodox liberal approach permits. First, it is holistic in the sense of perceiving the 'other' polity -not as an institutionally-defined corpus (e.g., as an electorate, or as a civil society, or as a set of survey data) comprised of atomistically autonomous individual beings -but as an organic inter-linkage of an 'ideational' telos with a 'structural' nomos (again, see Teubner, this volume): it is both population and community, both constituted and constituting. 106 It is both abstract structure, and "the living individuality of a nation." 107 Second, rather than see the constitution as the product of an instance of transcendental moment of pure reason, where the 'house' wherein political freedom can dwell is constructed in one go, this reflexivity recognizes that the constitution is an on-going narrative constantly interweaving a diversity of perspectives, concerns, and imaginations.
Relatedly, rather than seeing the constitution in terms of a dualist structure in which meaningful constitutional discoveries only occur during certain extraordinary and punctuated moments of political sobriety, so as to avoid sliding into political excess during the otherwise normal state of political drunkenness, 108 reflexivity sees the constitution as constantly negotiated and renegotiated in the public realm (and soberly, as per the principle of charity). 109 It thus constantly reminds us, as discussed above, how a "constitution" is always a perpetually, spontaneously, and even invisibly evolving work in progress.
Thirdly, in order to capture the constitution's structural symbiosis with other social systems in its regulatory environment, this reflexivity must recognize law, politics, and society to be dynamically interrelated in the constitutional evolution of the polity (see also which to analyze the various tensions that both are latent in the pluralist nature of the constitutional project and necessary for its evolutionary survival. These tensions are sometimes productive, sometimes destructive. But in either case, they define the focus of 'constitutional' -both insofar as an individual polity is concerned, and insofar as our more cosmopolitan understandings are concerned.
Along these lines, reflexivity requires us to not privilege or essentialize legal judgment and judicial interpretation as the principle sources of a normative constitutional order. Such a presumption is both under inclusive and over inclusive. On the one hand, while these are significant components of that order, they must not be confused for its whole. Whether and how a legal judgment is translated into action depends on the degree to which a political culture and background social order has internalised a relatively high level of obedience to the law and at least official acceptance of the rules of law-making. The canonical structures that constitute the structural-liberal vision are defined legally.
Because reflexive constitutionalism is more sensitive to constitutional change and to the diversity of normative influences that comprise the constitutional arena, it allows for practices of constitutional nomoi to take a wider varieties of political and legal forms. They can take the form of pre-theoretical practices. 113 They can take the form of particular narratives, including fictional or false narratives. 114 They can even take the form of a particular homeostatic political balance that emerges out of the perpetual clashes among the many irresolvable contradictions and conflicts that course through the social and political corpus of the nation (see, e.g., Harding, this volume). Even transparently duplicitous claims can develop an normative force of their own, a dynamic that that results in part from the innate political need to be seen to be keeping one's word. 115 constitutionalism itself, conceptions of what constitutes the public good are also pluralist and reflect different experiences, and traumas. Each perspective has value that transcends its instantiation; each is limited in its imagination. Reflexive constitutionalism attempts to expose what is otherwise concealed in debates over the relationship between the constitution, the polity and the public good. It does not offer to determine which institutional arrangements produce optimal outcomes, let alone to offer a constitutional blueprint for the future. Reflexivity is urged to contribute to a distinct and deeper enquiry into the nature of the constitution as an ongoing exercise of collective self-commitment.
